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BOOK REVIEWS
be done to put an end to the many indefensible "interstate trade
barriers" will find a persuasive brief ready at hand. 13
For at least nine men in Washington the book is required
reading. The absolute unconstitutionality of the 1938 volte-face
in Erie v. Tompkins is now demonstrated beyond question. If
the Supreme Court were then willing to rely on a piece of mis-
leading research published in the Harvard Law Review,14 by so
much more they ought now to rely on Mr. Crosskey's really
thorough analysis, overrule Erie, and get to their intended work
as the supreme head of a general and nation-wide system for
establishing Justice, as is provided by the document they have
all solemnly sworn to uphold.
Scholars in many fields will be interested in these and sub-
sequent volumes.15 The "dictionary of terms" which the author
has constructed will be of the first importance to the philologers.
American historians will now be obliged to re-examine (and,
perhaps, revise) a great many of their notions, as will the
political scientists. The idolators of the late Thomas Jefferson
and the late James Madison will, in these volumes, find good
reasons to pause in their devotions. 6 I even venture to think that
some law professors will be led to look at their familiar cases
with new vision.
While this general reassessment of ideas proceeds apace,
this reviewer would join in the sentiment manifested in the dedi-
cation of these volumes: "To the Congress of the United States,
in the hope that it may be led to claim and exercise for the com-
mon good of the country, the powers justly belonging to it under
the Constitution."
William B. Jeffrey, Jr.*
EQUALITY BY STATUTE, by Monroe Berger. Columbia University
Press, New York City, New York, 1952. Pp. ix, 238. $3.25.
This is a book that should be read by every person who
possesses views on the subject of legislation in the field of race
13. Pp. 295-323.
14. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary
Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49 (1923).
15. From the many hints scattered through these initial volumes, it would
seem that at least two more volumes will be necessary to the completion of
the work. Cf. especially pp. 6, 12, 82, 187, 510, 535.
16. For example, consider the perfectly fantastic frenzied maneuvers in
the subversive campaign issuing in U.S. v. Hudson d Goodwin and U.S. v.
Coolidge, recounted at pp. 754-784.
0 Assistant Law Librarian, Yale Law Library.
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relations. The opinions of some may be changed, those of others
will doubtless remain unaltered or perhaps be reaffirmed, but all
will be challenged.
In the Foreword to Mr. Berger's book Mr. Robert M. MacIver
says:
"No law should require men to change their attitudes,
but most laws require something that is contrary to the atti-
tudes of some group of men, whether large or small. No
law should punish men for their beliefs or attempt to sup-
press these beliefs, but many laws are necessary or desirable
that require behavior contrary to what some men approve
or believe to be the right course. The whole sphere of opin-
ion must be held inviolate by law, if the primary condition
of democracy is to be fulfilled. But it does not follow that
the behavior prompted by opinion or belief should not be
regulated for the public good. The distinction is elementary.
In a democracy we do not punish a man because he is opposed
to income taxes, or to free school education, or to vaccina-
tion, or to minimum wages, but the laws of a democracy
insist that he obey the laws that make provisions for these
things.
"On the same principle there should be no laws against
ethnic or racial prejudice. A man should never be subject
to legal penalties because he is anti any thing, anti any
group, anti any faith, anti any form of government. If he is
foolish enough to detest any people as such or to think he
belongs to the master race, and if we cannot teach him the
foolishness of his folly, then let him stew in it, so long as he
does not seek to injure in overt ways those against whom
his prejudice is directed. We may not let our 'righteousness'
interfere with the liberty of any opinion, for that is the
beginning of the road to totalitarianism itself. Righteous
indignation can be the most insidious enemy of democracy."
Mr. Berger epitomizes his own thesis at the very end of his
book where he says, "In summary, law can affect our acts and,
through them, our beliefs." Hence, his argument proceeds, legis-
lation designed to put an end to discriminatory action will lead
ultimately to the disappearance of the prejudice which prompts
it. To those who argue that behavior based upon private atti-
tudes and tastes cannot be changed by law, Mr. Berger con-
vincingly replies that "they themselves usually support laws
[VOL. XIII
BOOK REVIEWS
which require discrimination," and proceeds to elaborate upon
this premise as follows:
"To accept their position (and that of many well-meaning
persons who misunderstand law) would be to say that where
a law is backed by the community it is unnecessary, and
where a law is opposed by the community it is futile. This
view, implied more often than stated, simply ignores the
real problem of the effective limits of legal controls in
specific situations. Those who deny the efficacy of law in
group relations must, to be consistent, favor the repeal of
the vast network of legislation which now imposes and sup-
ports discriminatory patterns through the requirements of
segregation. If all such laws in the South were to be imme-
diately removed, no one, of course, would expect that there
would be free relations between Negroes and whites. There
are, after all, no laws requiring the exclusion of Jews from
many places which effectively exclude them, and Negroes
encounter discrimination even where the law forbids it.
But the elimination of discriminatory legislation would at
least pull out another of the props that support a system of
relations which violates the Federal Constitution and even
the stated values of the violators themselves."
In the publication of this book, Mr. Berger has demon-
strated a rare combination of superb scholarship and most read-
able writing to bring forth a persuasive thesis for the elimination
of discrimination based upon considerations of race or creed. As
a sociologist writing in the field of law, and treating a vast
number of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
he has shown a rare ability to cut through the legal underbrush,
sever the doctrines of the cases, and present them in thoroughly
understandable fashion.
Following a short Introduction, the essential plan of the
book is to present a two-phase series of flash-backs. The first
phase is developed in Chapter One where the author presents
the picture of "Civil Rights Today and During the Reconstruc-
tion Era," while the second 'phase consists of Chapters Two and
Three denominated "The Supreme Court 1868-1937: Buttressing
the Caste Order," and "The Supreme Court 1937-1950: Under-
mining the Caste Order," respectively. A fourth chapter is
devoted to a study (in considerable detail) of "The New York
State Law Against Discrimination: Operation and Administra-
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tion," and the final Chapter Five reflects upon "Law and the
Control of Prejudice and Discrimination.'
In his opening chapter Mr. Berger recounts the familiar story
of the ambitious program of the Reconstruction with its Thir-
teenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion, Civil Rights Acts and Peonage legislation, and their failure
to bring about freedom for the Negro. Five reasons are assigned
for the collapse of the program: (1) disaster at the hands of
the Supreme Court; (2) lack of sustained interest (a persistent
and adamant white minority in the South was disregarded by a
less adamant majority throughout the country bent upon new
conquests in the field of manufacture, commerce and a host of
other problems); (3) the Reconstruction program itself was too
ambitious, demanding far more painstaking effort in its admin-
istration than it was accorded; (4) state civil rights programs
in the North were not vigorously enforced, or even susceptible of
such enforcement, leaving the injured individual to institute pro-
ceedings on his own behalf; and (5) governments, both state
and federal, placed too much faith in the laws and failed to take
steps in the course of government administration (employment
and armed services, etc.) which might have led the way for
racial integration.
With the advent of the New Deal in 1933 this trend was
reversed and government demonstrated how it is truly capable
of conditioning public opinion by its own action as well as secur-
ing real freedom of opportunity for minorities through the adop-
tion of laws which attack the problem of racial minorities by
indirect methods. In some twenty pages the author packs an
amazing array of statistical material, recording the accomplish-
ments of New Deal programs which were of significance for the
Negro (Relief, Farm, Housing, Employment, Voting, Armed
Services, etc.).
In concluding his contrasting treatment of the civil rights
programs of these two widely separated eras, Mr. Berger says:
"The emphasis during the nineteenth century was upon
broad legislation, but this was not accompanied by institu-
tional changes of an economic, political, and social nature.
These laws protecting minorities had to be set in motion by
individuals. Today civil rights are advanced by the govern-
ment in a different way. Between the two periods there
have come (one series of events on top of another) Amer-
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ica's severest economic depression, the New Deal, a second
world war, and the threat of a third. Under the constant,
forceful impact of these developments, the American con-
ception of the role of government changed, and attitudes
toward racial and religious minorities have become more
favorable. As a result, the civil rights of these minorities
are, in our day, protected more directly by the state. All
levels of the government do things that affect us more inti-
mately than before, and in these activities government is
increasingly providing its services without discrimination.
On the federal level, governmental protection and advance-
ment of civil rights has used administrative and executive
powers; .. .State governments have relied upon new legis-
lation as well as upon administrative and executive power.
This legislation is of a new type-it asserts that discrimina-
tion harms not merely the victim but the community as
well, and consequently makes a state agency responsible
for reducing the incidence of discriminatory practices. The
state acts for the individual-as it did under the older federal
laws-in a situation deemed a peril to the entire community."
In his two chapters (Three and Four) on the role played by
the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Berger retells the
story already familiar to lawyers, of the fate of the Reconstruc-
tion program. Here are paraded the shriveling of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, the tortuous path of the Due Process of
Law Clause, and the disappointing (for the Negro and his sym-
pathizers) development of the Equal Protection Clause to em-
brace the separate but equal doctrine of the Plessy case. The
author also takes account of the substantial protection which the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause was construed by
the Court to confer upon business interests during the same
period, leading to the rhetorical question, "Whose Fourteenth
Amendment?"
Mr. Berger then proceeds to round out the story with the
development, beginning in 1937 when the Court reversed both
trends and began to allow legislatures greater freedom in the
regulation of the economic interests of business and looked
more and more askance upon alleged violations of civil rights.
Here he recounts the cases which have provided real bulwarks
of freedom for the Negro on such basic matters as jury exclusions
in criminal cases, voting, restrictive covenants, common carriers,
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education and labor. Separate sections are also devoted to dis-
cussions of the Japanese Evacuation during World War II, and
the Jehovah's Witnesses cases.
Throughout his treatment of the Supreme Court cases the
author adheres to his thesis that law tends both (a) to conform
to the general consensus of public thought, and (b) to crystallize
public opinion along the lines that it decrees. Thus, in defense of
the pre-1937 Court, Berger says:
"This review of the Supreme Court's handling of issues
involved in group discrimination between 1868 and 1937
shows that the Court was most consistent in the protection
of Negroes' rights to a fair trial, to exemption from forced
labor, to equal but separate public facilities, to enter any
business or occupation, and to make contracts. These are
rights the exercise of which is least likely to bring Negroes
into close personal association with whites on a level of
equality. Where the exercise of Negro rights might result in
equal intergroup association, e.g., in use of the same public
facilities, the Court was reluctant to uphold Negro claims.
Thus the Court's role was to support laws which enforced
the separation of the Negro and white castes and to strike
down laws which allowed or encouraged inter-caste contact
that implied their social equality.
"There is a variety of evidence that in carrying out the
function just described, the Court was responding to the
pattern of conduct and belief in that section of the American
community which was not willing to admit the Negro to full
citizenship and its implications. There is considerable resem-
blance between the rank order of decreasing discrimination
against Negroes as given by Myrdal and the rank order of
successful litigation by Negroes in the Supreme Court.
"According to Myrdal discrimination is shown against
the Negro in various activities, listed in order of decreasing
intensity as follows:
"1. Intermarriage and sexual relations involving white
women.
"2. Other personal relations, e.g., eating, dancing, bath-
ing, and general social intercourse.
"3. Use of public facilities, e.g., schools, churches, means
of transportation.
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"4. Political rights, i.e., suffrage.
"5. Discrimination in courts of law and by police and
other public officials.
"6. Economic -activities such as landownership, employ-
ment, obtaining credit, public relief."
and in appraising the work and tendencies of the present Court,
Mr. Berger says:
"The present Court has continued to protect the rights
of accused persons; advanced the protection of federal civil
rights by strengthening Sections 51 and 52 of the United
States Code; ended federal toleration of the South's white
primaries; made it unlawful for courts to enforce racial
restrictive covenants; outlawed segregation in interstate
travel; and advanced a step closer to educational equality
by a progressively stricter interpretation of what constitutes
'equal facilities.'
Berger's analysis in Chapter Four of the New York State
Law Against Discrimination is detailed and objective. He pulls
no punches. A number of surprising developments have ensued
following the adoption of the act. Many of its original opponents
are now actively supporting the measure. Its most severe critics
are the very minority groups which supported the act in the
legislature. Many of the criticisms which have been directed
against the work of the New York Commission appear super-
ficially to have merit, but upon closer examination the reader
pauses when he reflects upon the nature of the problems encoun-
tered. It is true that the Commission has handled a surprisingly
small number of cases, has dismissed a majority of the com-
plaints which have been filed, has made practically no use of
publicity channels, the delight of so many governmental agencies,
and had held only one administrative hearing, as of 1950. The
Commission answers each of these complaints persuasively, indi-
cating that education, in the broadest sense, is the primary objec-
tive of the law, and that its small case-load, method of settlement
by conciliation rather than hearings, and abstinence from sensa-
tional publicity are all a part of its policy to achieve that objec-
tive. Mr. Berger concludes that with all its difficulties, the New
York law is accomplishing results (although conceding that cri-
teria for determination in this area are admittedly unreliable).
In his concluding chapter the author reviews the materials
1953]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
presented in earlier chapters and places them in their sociological
and psychological framework, drawing a few conclusions con-
cerning the place of law in this context. His central thesis has
been set forth piecemeal throughout this review, but in justice
to him we should quote what appears to be his fuller, and to
this reviewer, his most persuasive, statement:
"Law is an effective means for reducing the discrimina-
tion or overt antiminority conduct of the extremely preju-
diced. We have seen that the personality studies have found
such persons to be conformists of a certain kind, respecters
of power, scorning the weak but toadying to the strong. One
of the few constants in their behavior is submission to the
symbols of power. Law, when it is backed by the full pano-
ply of the state and has strong support in at least some sec-
tions of the community, is just such a symbol. Even if law
did nothing but reduce discrimination by such persons it
would be accomplishing something of value in a multigroup
democracy. But there is evidence that antibias laws can
also influence the conditions under which our attitudes are
developed and maintained."
Assuming, for the moment, the truth of the assertion that
"antibias laws can also influence the conditions under which our
attitudes are developed and maintained," is there any reasonable
likelihood that such laws will be adopted within the foreseeable
future by southern states? If we are to judge the future by
looking to the past, the answer is an emphatic "no." Nevertheless,
this reviewer ventures the prediction that such legislation will
be forthcoming within the next two decades, and that the nation
will witness the phenomenon of pro-F.E.P.C. congressmen from
the Solid South. This prediction is based upon the assumption
that Negro voting will continue at its presently accelerating rate.
If opposition to equality of civil rights continues these voters
will tend to cast their votes as a bloc, just as they did in the
presidential election of 1952 (there is substantial evidence to
support the conclusion that it was the Negro vote which carried
the State of Louisiana for the Democratic Party by an uncom-
fortably slim margin in that election). With such a substantial
number of votes on the block, it is inevitable that political parties
and factions will seek to attract them with a favorable program.
Hence the prediction just ventured may not be as unrealistic as
it appears at first blush.
[VOL. XIII
BOOK REVIEWS
If and when such a day comes, and equality is achieved by
statute, Berger predicts that the Christian principle of "Love
thy neighbor" will in fact be fulfilled.
Charles A. Reynard*
LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS, by Francis X. Busch. Bobbs-
Merrill, Inc., Indianapolis, 1949. Pp. xxii, 1147.
"Twelve Good Men and True"-the bulwark of democracy
and the preserver of our freedom. Does Louisiana hold the jury
trial in the same degree of respect and reverence as do all the
other states of the Union? This is an interesting question, but in
view of the fact that the civil jury trial has been used very spar-
ingly in Louisiana up until recently, it has been said that Loui-
sianians do not have the same understanding and confidence in
the jury system as do those who see it in more constant usage.
Perhaps the reluctance of Louisiana atorneys to use the civil
jury trial is attributable to the provision in our law which grants
the appellate court the right to review the facts of any given case.
It has been generally felt by plaintiffs' attorneys that our law
is not geared for effective civil jury trials; this explains the
negligible part that jury trials have played in the legal history
of our state.
During the last several years, however, there has been a
trend toward the more frequent use of the civil jury trial. Many
prominent Louisiana attorneys have apparently been enlight-
ened relative to the advantages that the jury trial affords, and
have been putting it to very effective use in the federal courts
and have even used it to some extent in the state courts. This
trend in Louisiana developed on the heels of a nationwide rejuve-
nation or modernization of jury practice. Certain leading legal
luminaries have achieved phenomenal success by injecting new
methods and devices into jury practice, such as the more exten-
sive and refined use of demonstrative evidence-charts, pictures,
diagrams, blackboards, et cetera. Their ideas and methods have
been spread throughout the country, and they have given the
jury system a boost which might well return that system to the
stature which it once held.
Regardless of how one feels about the jury trial, he cannot
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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